Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.009zbMath1347.91120OpenAlexW1557536073MaRDI QIDQ495652

Marco Faravelli, Randall P. Walsh, Priscilla T. Y. Man

Publication date: 15 September 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/abstract/474.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

turnoutcostly votinglarge electionsmandatepaternalism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (3)

Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing ⋮ The electoral college, battleground states, and rule-utilitarian voting ⋮ Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
• Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
• Altruism and voting: a large-turnout result that does not rely on civic duty or cooperative behavior
• Welfare reducing polls
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• Large Poisson games
• Aggregating Information by Voting: The Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses
• Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates

This page was built for publication: Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections