Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.009zbMath1347.91120MaRDI QIDQ495652

Marco Faravelli, Randall P. Walsh, Priscilla T. Y. Man

Publication date: 15 September 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/abstract/474.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

turnout; costly voting; large elections; mandate; paternalism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B12: Voting theory

91F10: History, political science

Related Items

Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing, Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse, The electoral college, battleground states, and rule-utilitarian voting

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