Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections
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Publication:495652
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.05.009zbMATH Open1347.91120OpenAlexW1557536073MaRDI QIDQ495652FDOQ495652
Authors: Marco Faravelli, Priscilla T. Y. Man, Randall P. Walsh 
Publication date: 15 September 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/abstract/474.pdf
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Cites Work
- Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
- Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
- Large Poisson games
- Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Aggregating Information by Voting: The Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses
- Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
- A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
- Altruism and voting: a large-turnout result that does not rely on civic duty or cooperative behavior
- Welfare reducing polls
Cited In (4)
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