Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:495652)
Recommendations
- Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
- Coordination and turnout in large elections
- Altruism and voting: a large-turnout result that does not rely on civic duty or cooperative behavior
- Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse
- A theory of voting in large elections
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099366 (Why is no real title available?)
- A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
- Aggregating information by voting: the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses
- Altruism and voting: a large-turnout result that does not rely on civic duty or cooperative behavior
- Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
- Large Poisson games
- Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
- Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
- Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
- Welfare reducing polls
Cited in
(4)
This page was built for publication: Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q495652)