Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.05.009MaRDI QIDQ495652zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marco Faravelli, Priscilla T. Y. Man, Randall P. Walsh

Publication date 15 September 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/abstract/474.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

turnoutcostly votinglarge electionsmandatepaternalism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099366 (Why is no real title available?)
• A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
• Aggregating information by voting: the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses
• Altruism and voting: a large-turnout result that does not rely on civic duty or cooperative behavior
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• Large Poisson games
• Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
• Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
• Welfare reducing polls

Cited in

(4)

• Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• The electoral college, battleground states, and rule-utilitarian voting
• Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse

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