Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections
From MaRDI portal
Publication:495652
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.009zbMath1347.91120MaRDI QIDQ495652
Marco Faravelli, Randall P. Walsh, Priscilla T. Y. Man
Publication date: 15 September 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/abstract/474.pdf
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