Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse
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Publication:523481
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.12.005zbMATH Open1409.91106OpenAlexW2565394785MaRDI QIDQ523481FDOQ523481
Publication date: 21 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.005
Recommendations
electionspolarizationvotinginformation aggregationabstentionturnoutpublic opinionideologyjury theoremmandatespartiesswing voter's curse
Cites Work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
- A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
- Population uncertainty and Poisson games
- Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections
- Why do people rate? Theory and evidence on online ratings
- Aggregating Information by Voting: The Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses
- Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
- Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
- Voting as Communicating
- Public Protests and Policy Making*
- A signaling model of repeated elections
Cited In (6)
- Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections
- Voting as a signaling device
- The Bismut-Elworthy-Li formula for mean-field stochastic differential equations
- Polling in a proportional representation system
- Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
- Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy
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