Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.12.005MaRDI QIDQ523481zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joseph McMurray

Publication date 21 April 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.005

zbMATH Keywords

abstentionelectionsideologyinformation aggregationjury theoremmandatespartiespolarizationpublic opinionswing voter's curseturnoutvoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
• Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections
• A signaling model of repeated elections
• Pivots versus signals in elections
• Voting as a signaling device

Cites work

• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
• A signaling model of repeated elections
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Aggregating information by voting: the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections
• Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Public protests and policy making
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
• Voting as Communicating
• Why do people rate? Theory and evidence on online ratings

Cited in

(10)

• Polling in a proportional representation system
• The Bismut-Elworthy-Li formula for mean-field stochastic differential equations
• Voting as a signaling device
• Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections
• Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy
• Voting as Communicating
• Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
• Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections
• A signaling model of repeated elections

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