Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.05.010MaRDI QIDQ2675438zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Carlo Prato, Stephane Wolton

Publication date 23 September 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.010

zbMATH Keywords

electionsinformation aggregationrepresentative democracy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) History, political science (91F10)

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Cites work

• A political theory of populism
• Aggregating information by voting: the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses
• Electoral competition under imperfect information
• Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Hiding information in electoral competition.
• Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility
• Informative cheap talk in elections
• One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
• Pandering and electoral competition
• Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
• Pivots versus signals in elections
• Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections
• Preference monotonicity and information aggregation in elections
• Public protests and policy making
• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
• Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals
• The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
• The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences
• Voting as Communicating
• Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information

Cited in

(9)

• The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting
• The ambigous role of social influence on the wisdom of crowds: an analytic approach
• Epistemic democracy with correlated voters
• Preference monotonicity and information aggregation in elections
• One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
• Aggregating information by voting: the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses
• Public protests and policy making
• Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility
• Voting equilibria and public funding of political parties

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