The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.008zbMath1419.91255OpenAlexW3121686635MaRDI QIDQ1735764

Rebecca B. Morton, Marco Piovesan, Jean-Robert Tyran

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/dp_2012/1208.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

votinginformation aggregationwisdom of crowdssocial informationcognitive biases

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Voting theory (91B12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (2)

Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections ⋮ Conformity and truthful voting under different voting rules

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

• The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study
• Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
• Opinion leaders, independence, and Condorcet's jury theorem
• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Do asset market prices reflect traders' judgment biases?
• Propagation of individual bias through group judgment: Error in the treatment of asymmetrically informative signals
• Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice
• An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation
• The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory
• Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes

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