Opinion leaders, independence, and Condorcet's jury theorem

DOI10.1007/BF01079210zbMATH Open0800.90046OpenAlexW2069939192MaRDI QIDQ1316656FDOQ1316656

Authors: David M. Estlund 

Publication date: 18 April 1994

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01079210

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Thirteen theorems in search of the truth
• Proving a distribution-free generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem

Cited In (10)

• Epistemic democracy with correlated voters
• The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting
• A brief note on a further refinement of the Condorcet jury theorem for heterogeneous groups
• A general jury theorem on group decision making
• A model of jury decisions where all jurors have the same evidence
• Democratic answers to complex questions -- an epistemic perspective
• Anchoring in deliberations
• A survey on Neyman-Pearson classification and suggestions for future research
• Conciliationism and merely possible disagreement
• Extending the Condorcet jury theorem to a general dependent jury

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