Opinion leaders, independence, and Condorcet's jury theorem

DOI10.1007/BF01079210MaRDI QIDQ1316656zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David M. Estlund

Publication date 18 April 1994

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01079210

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
• Proving a distribution-free generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem
• Thirteen theorems in search of the truth

Cited in

(10)

• A survey on Neyman-Pearson classification and suggestions for future research
• Anchoring in deliberations
• Extending the Condorcet jury theorem to a general dependent jury
• Epistemic democracy with correlated voters
• Conciliationism and merely possible disagreement
• A general jury theorem on group decision making
• The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting
• Democratic answers to complex questions -- an epistemic perspective
• A model of jury decisions where all jurors have the same evidence
• A brief note on a further refinement of the Condorcet jury theorem for heterogeneous groups

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