The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.009zbMath1347.91123OpenAlexW2265342894MaRDI QIDQ290181

Jens Großer, Michael Seebauer

Publication date: 1 June 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ockenfels.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/stawi-ockenfels/pdf/wp_series_download/wp0064.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

laboratory experimentsCondorcet jury modelinformation search and aggregationvoluntary and compulsory votingvoting behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (9)

Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It's a matter of timing ⋮ Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections ⋮ Compulsory versus voluntary voting: an experimental study ⋮ The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting ⋮ Unanimous rules in the laboratory ⋮ Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence ⋮ Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice ⋮ The swing voter's curse in social networks ⋮ Jury voting without objective probability

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

• Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
• Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
• Information acquisition in committees
• Compulsory versus voluntary voting: an experimental study
• Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Voting to Tell Others
• The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Cursed Equilibrium

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