Jury voting without objective probability

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0918-ZzbMATH Open1341.91034OpenAlexW2172662790MaRDI QIDQ258945FDOQ258945

King King Li, Toru Suzuki

Publication date: 10 March 2016

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10453/77679

Recommendations

• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals
• Jury theorems with multiple alternatives
• Conservativeness in jury decision-making
• A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study
• An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation
• The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information

Cited In (5)

• Considerations on jury size and composition using lower probabilities
• Conservativeness in jury decision-making
• A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood
• Deliberative voting
• A Bayesian model of voting in juries

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