Information acquisition in committees
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Publication:2427124
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.007zbMath1152.91419OpenAlexW3125241464MaRDI QIDQ2427124
Publication date: 8 May 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d14/d1411-r.pdf
Related Items (23)
The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study ⋮ Deliberative voting ⋮ Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation ⋮ Stable unions ⋮ The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition ⋮ Information acquisition and full surplus extraction ⋮ Information acquisition in committees ⋮ Information acquisition and transparency in committees ⋮ The price of `one person, one vote' ⋮ Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent ⋮ Abstention, ideology and information acquisition ⋮ Pivotal persuasion ⋮ Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study ⋮ Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise ⋮ Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence ⋮ Endogenous information and stochastic contracts ⋮ Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition ⋮ Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low? ⋮ Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes ⋮ Delegated expertise: implementability with peer-monitoring ⋮ Pretrial beliefs and verdict accuracy: costly juror effort and free riding ⋮ Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers ⋮ Pessimistic information gathering
Cites Work
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- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
- Pivotal players and the characterization of influence
- Information efficiency and majority decisions
- Deliberative voting
- Information acquisition in committees
- Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
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