Information efficiency and majority decisions

DOI10.1007/BF00186280zbMATH Open0844.90130OpenAlexW2020283498MaRDI QIDQ1908526FDOQ1908526

Hans Gersbach

Publication date: 2 September 1996

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00186280

zbMATH Keywords

characterization of equilibriaprivate information acquisitiontwo-stage voting game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Voting theory (91B12)

Cited In (3)

• Information acquisition and transparency in committees
• The value of public information in majority decisions
• Information acquisition in committees

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