Would rational voters acquire costly information?
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Publication:2496787
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.005zbMath1132.91400OpenAlexW1994684763WikidataQ56226517 ScholiaQ56226517MaRDI QIDQ2496787
Publication date: 20 July 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.005
Related Items (26)
The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study ⋮ Public information and electoral bias ⋮ Rational ignorance and voting behavior ⋮ Epistemic democracy with correlated voters ⋮ The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition ⋮ Information acquisition and full surplus extraction ⋮ Majority rule or delegation? A normal noise case ⋮ Paying for inattention ⋮ Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation ⋮ Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections ⋮ The price of `one person, one vote' ⋮ Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin? ⋮ Pandering and electoral competition ⋮ Abstention, ideology and information acquisition ⋮ Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting ⋮ Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence ⋮ Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice ⋮ Voluntary voting: costs and benefits ⋮ Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments ⋮ The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences ⋮ Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition ⋮ Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low? ⋮ Delegated expertise: implementability with peer-monitoring ⋮ Voting on tricky questions ⋮ Pretrial beliefs and verdict accuracy: costly juror effort and free riding ⋮ Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers
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