Would rational voters acquire costly information?

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.005zbMath1132.91400WikidataQ56226517 ScholiaQ56226517MaRDI QIDQ2496787

César Martinelli

Publication date: 20 July 2006

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.005

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisition; strategic voting; rational ignorance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91B12: Voting theory

91F10: History, political science

Related Items

Information acquisition and full surplus extraction, Voluntary voting: costs and benefits, Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?, Public information and electoral bias, Rational ignorance and voting behavior, The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences, Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition, Majority rule or delegation? A normal noise case, Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?, Pandering and electoral competition, Abstention, ideology and information acquisition

Cites Work

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• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates