Delegated expertise: implementability with peer-monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.12.008MaRDI QIDQ2078070zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yaron Azrieli

Publication date 25 February 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.008

zbMATH Keywords

implementationinformation acquisitionmonitoringmoral hazard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Recommendations

• Monitoring experts
• Dynamic expert incentives in teams
• The organization of expertise in the presence of communication
• Informational control and organizational design
• The not-so-secret-agent: professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation.

Cites work

• Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
• Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5547975 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2156776 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3320765 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3090557 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information acquisition in committees
• Mechanism design with information acquisition
• Monitoring experts
• Robust incentives for information acquisition
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?

Cited in

(4)

• The not-so-secret-agent: professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation.
• Monitoring experts
• Information technology and government decentralization: experimental evidence from Paraguay
• Contracting with heterogeneous researchers

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