Monitoring experts

DOI10.3982/TE4017MaRDI QIDQ3390544zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yaron Azrieli

Publication date 24 March 2022

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te4017

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionmonitoringmoral hazardvalue of information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Recommendations

• Robust incentives for information acquisition
• Optimal Monitoring Design
• Delegated expertise: implementability with peer-monitoring
• Reservation wage and optimal contract for experts
• Incentive contracts and strictly proper scoring rules.

Cited in

(14)

• Incentive contracts and strictly proper scoring rules.
• A difficulty in the testing of strategic experts
• Dynamic expert incentives in teams
• Delegated expertise: implementability with peer-monitoring
• Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers
• Consulting collusive experts
• Robust incentives for information acquisition
• Reservation wage and optimal contract for experts
• Minimum-regret contracts for principal-expert problems
• Optimal contract design for effort-averse sensors
• Changing One's Mind when the Facts Change: Incentives of Experts and the Design of Reporting Protocols
• Optimal transparency of monitoring capability
• Contracting with heterogeneous researchers
• Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting

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