Consulting collusive experts

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.04.011zbMATH Open1447.91037OpenAlexW3024547467MaRDI QIDQ2195705FDOQ2195705

Masatoshi Tsumagari, Dilip Mookherjee, Alberto Motta

Publication date: 27 August 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.011

Recommendations

• Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
• The organization of expertise in the presence of communication
• Monitoring experts
• Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences
• Principal and expert agent

zbMATH Keywords

collusionmechanism designexpertdelegation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models
• Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism
• Optimal Auction Design
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Optimal collusion-proof auctions
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
• Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• Decentralization and collusion
• Mechanism design with collusive supervision
• Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information

Cited In (4)

• Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
• Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion
• When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships
• Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences

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