Consulting collusive experts
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Publication:2195705
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.04.011zbMath1447.91037OpenAlexW3024547467MaRDI QIDQ2195705
Masatoshi Tsumagari, Dilip Mookherjee, Alberto Motta
Publication date: 27 August 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.011
Mechanism design theory (91B03) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)
Related Items (2)
Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion ⋮ Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
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