Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
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Publication:3044078
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.000244zbMath1106.91345OpenAlexW3124376021MaRDI QIDQ3044078
David Martimort, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Antoine Faure-Grimaud
Publication date: 10 August 2004
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.000244
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