Optimal collusion-proof auctions
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Publication:1007321
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.004zbMath1157.91342OpenAlexW2128089223MaRDI QIDQ1007321
Publication date: 20 March 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.004
Related Items (12)
Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values ⋮ Coalition-proof full efficient implementation ⋮ Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Self-rejecting mechanisms ⋮ Consulting collusive experts ⋮ Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion ⋮ Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations ⋮ Multi-dimensional procurement auction under uncertain and asymmetric information ⋮ Bidding collusion without passive updating ⋮ Bribing in second-price auctions
Cites Work
- Mechanism design with collusive supervision
- Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
- Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
- Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
- Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
- Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
- Bidder collusion
- Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
- Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
- Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
- Optimal Auction Design
- Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
- A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Collusion and Price Rigidity
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