Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions

DOI10.1006/game.1994.1045zbMath0809.90035OpenAlexW2026189570MaRDI QIDQ1338973

Jean-Francois Richard, Robert C. Marshall, Michael J. Meurer, Walter R. Stromquist

Publication date: 27 November 1994

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/9d2a020f4b00349181e8a576a0958c2953b24a62

zbMATH Keywords

first price auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (40)

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