Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.009zbMath1236.91073MaRDI QIDQ719874

Omer Biran, Françoise Forges

Publication date: 12 October 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/4100

zbMATH Keywords

auctions; core; collusion; Bayesian game; partition function game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities, Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values, Coalition-proof full efficient implementation, Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction, The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities, COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS

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