Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
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Publication:976344
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2010.02.040zbMATH Open1188.91080OpenAlexW2126464772MaRDI QIDQ976344FDOQ976344
Authors: Gadi Fibich, Arieh Gavious 
Publication date: 11 June 2010
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.02.040
Recommendations
- Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
- Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
- Revenue equivalence of large asymmetric auctions
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
- Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
- Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
- Equilibrium selection in interdependent value auctions
- Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale
- Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
- Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
Cites Work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Optimal Auction Design
- Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs
- Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
- Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
- Modeling and analysis of an auction-based logistics market
- Emerging multiple issue e-auctions
- Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders
- Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
- All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
Cited In (6)
- Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
- Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
- Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders
- Revenue equivalence of large asymmetric auctions
- Ranking asymmetric auctions
- Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
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