Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2010.02.040zbMath1188.91080OpenAlexW2126464772MaRDI QIDQ976344

Gadi Fibich, Arieh Gavious

Publication date: 11 June 2010

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.02.040

zbMATH Keywords

perturbation analysisasymmetric auctionsinterdependent valuesrevenue equivalence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders ⋮ Ranking asymmetric auctions ⋮ Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions

Cites Work

• All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
• Modeling and analysis of an auction-based logistics market
• Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders
• Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Emerging multiple issue e-auctions
• Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs
• Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach

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