Ranking asymmetric auctions
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Publication:2453493
In the current study on auction theory, and using perturbation analysis techniques, the authors address the problem of how the seller's expected revenue changes as a result of asymmetry and the problem of revenue ranking between first and second price auctions.
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Cites work
- A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions
- A note on the effect of asymmetry on revenue in second-price auctions
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Asymmetric first price auctions
- Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
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Cited in
(39)- Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders
- Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples
- Comparative statics in first price auctions
- Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
- On the impact of low-balling: experimental results in asymmetric auctions
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- Asymmetric price-benefits auctions
- Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
- Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals
- Using bidder asymmetry to increase seller revenue
- Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions
- Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions
- Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices
- Sequential bidding in asymmetric first price auctions
- A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders
- Asymmetric first price auctions
- Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction
- Auctions with asymmetric common-values: the first-price format
- Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
- A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions
- Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
- On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
- Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders
- Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Revenue equivalence of large asymmetric auctions
- On asymmetric reserve prices
- The multidimensional auctions with asymmetric suppliers
- Incentivizing advertiser networks to submit multiple bids
- A note on the effect of asymmetry on revenue in second-price auctions
- Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
- Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions
- Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
- Low and high types in asymmetric first-price auctions
- Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale
- Asymmetric auctions with discretely distributed valuations
- Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions
- Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions
- A measure of the variability of revenue in auctions: A look at the revenue equivalence theorem
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