Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:5704152)
Recommendations
- Ranking asymmetric auctions
- Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
- Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions
- Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
- On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
Cited in
(30)- Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders
- Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions
- Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
- Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts
- Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
- Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences
- Asymmetric first price auctions
- Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction
- Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
- Ranking asymmetric auctions
- Shapley-Folkman-Lyapunov theorem and asymmetric first price auctions
- Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
- Asymmetric first-price auctions-A dynamical-systems approach
- On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
- Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty
- Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
- Revenue equivalence of large asymmetric auctions
- On asymmetric reserve prices
- Large asymmetric first-price auctions -- a boundary-layer approach
- Qualitative analysis of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in weak asymmetric auctions
- Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5032929 (Why is no real title available?)
- Learning in repeated auctions
- Numerical Solution of Asymmetric Auctions
- Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium
- Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
- The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups
- Asymmetric auctions: perturbations, \(\varepsilon\)-equilibrium, and equilibrium
- All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
- Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
This page was built for publication: Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5704152)