Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.01.016MaRDI QIDQ2442843zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors René Kirkegaard

Publication date 1 April 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.016

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric auctionsdispersive orderrevenue rankingstar order

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions
• A note on strong unimodality and dispersivity
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Asymmetric first price auctions
• Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
• Dispersive distributions, and the connection between dispersivity and strong unimodality
• Dispersive functions and stochastic orders
• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• Four notions of mean-preserving increase in risk, risk attitudes and applications to the rank-dependent expected utility model
• Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions
• Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions
• On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Optimal advertising of auctions
• Ranking asymmetric auctions
• Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions
• Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
• Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions
• Stochastic orders
• Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions

Cited in

(9)

• Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions
• Sequential bidding in asymmetric first price auctions
• Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information
• Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
• A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions
• Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
• Aging notions, stochastic orders, and expected utilities
• Asymmetric auctions with discretely distributed valuations
• Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions

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