Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.08.008MaRDI QIDQ536096zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vlad Mares, Jeroen M. Swinkels

Publication date 16 May 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.008

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designprocurementasymmetric auctionsrho-concavitysecond price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Stochastic models in economics (91B70)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5485518 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3373547 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3417266 (Why is no real title available?)
• Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium
• Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Convex set functions in d-space
• Efficiency and surplus bounds in Cournot competition.
• Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
• On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Total positivity absorption probabilities and applications

Cited in

(12)

• Second-price ad auctions with binary bids and markets with good competition
• An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
• The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes
• On second-price auctions and imperfect competition.
• Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
• Second-Price All-Pay Auctions and Best-Reply Matching Equilibria
• On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5845905 (Why is no real title available?)
• Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction
• Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
• Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders
• Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition

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