Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.08.008zbMATH Open1236.91079OpenAlexW2143763840MaRDI QIDQ536096FDOQ536096

Authors: Vlad Mares, Jeroen M. Swinkels 

Publication date: 16 May 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.008

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zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designprocurementasymmetric auctionsrho-concavitysecond price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Stochastic models in economics (91B70)

Cites Work

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• Optimal Auction Design
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Convex set functions in d-space
• On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
• Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem
• Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium
• Efficiency and surplus bounds in Cournot competition.
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• Total positivity absorption probabilities and applications

Cited In (12)

• Second-price ad auctions with binary bids and markets with good competition
• An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
• The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes
• On second-price auctions and imperfect competition.
• Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
• Second-Price All-Pay Auctions and Best-Reply Matching Equilibria
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction
• Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
• Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders
• Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition

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