A note on the effect of asymmetry on revenue in second-price auctions

DOI10.1142/S0219198912500193MaRDI QIDQ5325973zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Arieh Gavious, Yizhaq Minchuk

Publication date 31 July 2013

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198912500193

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric auctionssecond-price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Ranking asymmetric auctions
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
• Revenue equivalence of large asymmetric auctions
• Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions

Cites work

• Low and high types in asymmetric first-price auctions
• Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions

Cited in

(8)

• Using bidder asymmetry to increase seller revenue
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Revenue equivalence of large asymmetric auctions
• Separating equilibria in auctions with two types of bidders
• The Effect of Asymmetric Bidder Size on an Auction’s Performance: Are More Bidders Always Better?
• Ranking asymmetric auctions
• Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
• Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions

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