Using bidder asymmetry to increase seller revenue

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2003.12.003MaRDI QIDQ1927520zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paul Povel, Rajdeep Singh

Publication date 1 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2003.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric biddersauctionscommon value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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• Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information
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Cites work

• Asymmetric Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design

Cited in

(2)

• Optimal IPO mechanism with retail investors and two asymmetric institutional investors
• The value of information for auctioneers

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