Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
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Publication:2867516
DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2012-0014zbMATH Open1278.91071OpenAlexW1996394718MaRDI QIDQ2867516FDOQ2867516
Nicola Doni, Domenico Menicucci
Publication date: 19 December 2013
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/18355/ECO_2011_27.pdf?sequence=1
Cites Work
- Optimal Auction Design
- Asymmetric Auctions
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- The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
- Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
- Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
- Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
- Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
- Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions
- Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence.
- Comparative statics in first price auctions
- Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
- Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders
- Ranking asymmetric auctions
- Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
- Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions
- Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
- A note on information revelation in procurement auctions
- Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
- Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
Cited In (8)
- Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance
- Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
- Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
- A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders
- Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions
- Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
- Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
- Sequential bidding in asymmetric first price auctions
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