Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
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Publication:2867516
Recommendations
- Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
- Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance
- Revenue equivalence of large asymmetric auctions
- Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
- Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
- Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
- Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions
- Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples
- Revenue ranking of discriminatory and uniform auctions with an unknown number of bidders
- Revenue equivalence in multi-object auctions
Cites work
- A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions
- A note on information revelation in procurement auctions
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
- Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
- Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
- Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders
- Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
- Comparative statics in first price auctions
- Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence.
- Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
- Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
- Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
- Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Ranking asymmetric auctions
- Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
- Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions
- Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
- Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
- The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
Cited in
(23)- Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information
- The multidimensional auctions with asymmetric suppliers
- Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
- Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information
- Asymmetric wheat auctions with resale and partially divisible bidding objects
- Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
- Sequential bidding in asymmetric first price auctions
- The discrete bid first auction
- On asymmetric reserve prices
- Ranking asymmetric auctions
- Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction
- Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions
- Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
- Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders
- Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions
- Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
- A note on the effect of asymmetry on revenue in second-price auctions
- Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
- A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders
- Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance
- Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
- Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions
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