Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2009.07.018zbMath1179.91091OpenAlexW1971699310MaRDI QIDQ1046344

David A. Malueg, Ram Orzach

Publication date: 21 December 2009

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.07.018

zbMATH Keywords

second-price auctionfirst-price auctionrevenue comparison

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps ⋮ Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting ⋮ Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals ⋮ Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information ⋮ Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information ⋮ Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information

Cites Work

• Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
• Competitive bidding and proprietary information
• Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Note—Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalyzed
• Asymmetric Auctions