Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0524-4MaRDI QIDQ521880zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ezra Einy, Mridu Prabal Goswami, Ori Haimanko, Ram Orzach, Aner Sela

Publication date 12 April 2017

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1306.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcommon-value all-pay auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05)

Recommendations

• Common-value contests with asymmetric information
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Cites work

• All-Pay Contests
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
• Contest architecture
• Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
• Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
• Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information
• Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information
• Information in conflicts.
• Multi-player contests with asymmetric information
• Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information
• Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case

Cited in

(17)

• Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
• Common-value contests with asymmetric information
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• All-pay auctions with asymmetric effort constraints
• Two-stage elimination games
• Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs
• The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes
• Multi-player contests with asymmetric information
• The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions
• Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information
• Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux
• Costly information providing in binary contests
• The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
• Common-value group contests with asymmetric information
• All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values
• Almost common value auctions and discontinuous equilibria
• Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach

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