Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information

DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0524-4zbMath1398.91292OpenAlexW3124530640MaRDI QIDQ521880

Ori Haimanko, Aner Sela, Ram Orzach, Mridu Prabal Goswami, Ezra Einy

Publication date: 12 April 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1306.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcommon-value all-pay auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Two-stage elimination games, The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes

Cites Work

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