Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0524-4zbMATH Open1398.91292OpenAlexW3124530640MaRDI QIDQ521880FDOQ521880

Authors: Ezra Einy, Mridu Prabal Goswami, Ori Haimanko, Ram Orzach, Aner Sela 

Publication date: 12 April 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1306.pdf

Recommendations

• Common-value contests with asymmetric information
• Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
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• Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information
• The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcommon-value all-pay auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05)

Cites Work

• Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
• Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information
• Contest architecture
• Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
• Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
• All-Pay Contests
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information
• Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
• Information in conflicts.
• Multi-player contests with asymmetric information
• Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information

Cited In (17)

• Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
• Common-value contests with asymmetric information
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• Two-stage elimination games
• All-pay auctions with asymmetric effort constraints
• Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs
• The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes
• Multi-player contests with asymmetric information
• The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions
• Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information
• Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux
• Costly information providing in binary contests
• The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
• Common-value group contests with asymmetric information
• All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values
• Almost common value auctions and discontinuous equilibria
• Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach

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