The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.04.007zbMATH Open1296.91132OpenAlexW3125388682MaRDI QIDQ2016242FDOQ2016242

Christian Seel

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79930

Recommendations

• Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
• Common-value contests with asymmetric information

zbMATH Keywords

head startasymmetric informationall-pay contests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• Information acquisition in conflicts
• Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information

Cited In (6)

• Gambling in contests with random initial law
• A tug-of-war team contest
• Designing Dynamic Contests
• Discrimination in a model of contests with incomplete information about ability
• Gambling in contests with heterogeneous loss constraints
• On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions

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