The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.04.007MaRDI QIDQ2016242zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christian Seel

Publication date 19 June 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79930

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay contestsasymmetric informationhead start

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
• Common-value contests with asymmetric information

Cites work

• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
• Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• Information acquisition in conflicts

Cited in

(10)

• Gambling in contests with heterogeneous loss constraints
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• A tug-of-war team contest
• Gambling in contests with random initial law
• Discrimination in a model of contests with incomplete information about ability
• Information acquisition in conflicts
• On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions
• Designing dynamic contests
• Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information
• Player strength and effort in contests

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