On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.05.018MaRDI QIDQ485580zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christian Seel, Cédric Wasser

Publication date 12 January 2015

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/45f949ee-6f11-4214-ba5d-e462eef3ac96

zbMATH Keywords

head startcontestall-pay auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts
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Cites work

• Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents
• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
• The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions

Cited in

(10)

• Designing dynamic contests
• Two-stage elimination contests with optimal head starts
• Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information
• Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts
• Keep on fighting: the dynamics of head starts in all-pay auctions
• Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles
• On the optimal allocation of prizes in best-of-three all-pay auctions
• Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts
• Head starts in dynamic tournaments?
• On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests

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