Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts

DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0816-9zbMath1307.91091OpenAlexW2011233852MaRDI QIDQ485431

Aner Sela, Ella Segev

Publication date: 9 January 2015

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0816-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts, Keep on fighting: the dynamics of head starts in all-pay auctions, Two-stage contests with preferences over style, Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information, Analysing a built-in advantage in asymmetric darts contests using causal machine learning, Favouritism and corruption in procurement auctions, Sequential all-pay auctions with noisy outputs, Competitive balance when winning breeds winners, Discrimination in contests: a survey, Two-stage elimination contests with optimal head starts, Sequential bidding in asymmetric first price auctions

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