Discrimination in contests: a survey

DOI10.1007/S10058-016-0186-0MaRDI QIDQ726620zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yosef Mealem, Shmuel Nitzan

Publication date 12 July 2016

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0186-0

zbMATH Keywords

revenue maximizationcontest success functionlotterycontest designall-pay-auctioncovert and head starts-discriminationdirectovert

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Discrimination in a model of contests with incomplete information about ability
• Contests with endogenous discrimination
• A theory of perceived discrimination
• Unfair contests
• Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem

Cites work

• Asymmetric contests with general technologies
• Contest architecture
• Contest success functions
• Contest success functions: an extension
• Contests with Ties
• Contests with endogenous discrimination
• Discrimination in contests: a survey
• Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction
• Foundations for contest success functions
• Group contest success functions
• Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
• Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
• On a class of contest success functions
• Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• The politics of randomness
• The theory of contests: a survey
• Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
• Unfair contests
• Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types

Cited in

(14)

• Equivalent modes of reimbursement in augmented contests
• Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction
• Discrimination in festival games with limited observability and accessibility
• Contests with endogenous discrimination
• Gaining advantage by winning contests
• Artificial distinction and real discrimination
• Discrimination in a model of contests with incomplete information about ability
• Optimal tie-breaking rules
• Group formation in a dominance-seeking contest
• A theory of perceived discrimination
• Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation
• Discrimination in contests: a survey
• Centralized assignment of prizes and contestants
• Competitive balance when winning breeds winners

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