Centralized assignment of prizes and contestants

DOI10.1007/S00355-023-01483-1MaRDI QIDQ6541013zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Stefano Barbieri, Marco Serena

Publication date 17 May 2024

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cites work

• A contest success function for rankings
• Ability grouping in contests
• All-Pay Contests
• Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes
• Biased contests for symmetric players
• Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players
• Contest architecture
• Discrimination in contests: a survey
• Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
• Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: complete results
• Matching and price competition: beyond symmetric linear costs
• Micro foundations of multi-prize lottery contests: a perspective of noisy performance ranking
• On the optimal design of biased contests
• Optimal Award Scheme in Innovation Tournaments
• Participation incentives in rank order tournaments with endogenous entry
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• The beauty of ``bigness: On optimal design of multi-winner contests
• The optimal multi-stage contest

Cited in

(2)

• Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles
• Submission costs in risk-taking contests

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