Centralized assignment of prizes and contestants

DOI10.1007/S00355-023-01483-1zbMATH Open1539.91036MaRDI QIDQ6541013FDOQ6541013

Authors: Stefano Barbieri, Marco Serena 

Publication date: 17 May 2024

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Contest architecture
• All-Pay Contests
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes
• Matching and price competition: beyond symmetric linear costs
• The optimal multi-stage contest
• The beauty of ``bigness: On optimal design of multi-winner contests
• Micro foundations of multi-prize lottery contests: a perspective of noisy performance ranking
• Participation incentives in rank order tournaments with endogenous entry
• Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
• Discrimination in contests: a survey
• Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: complete results
• On the optimal design of biased contests
• Biased contests for symmetric players
• Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players
• Optimal Award Scheme in Innovation Tournaments
• A contest success function for rankings
• Ability grouping in contests

Cited In (2)

• Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles
• Submission costs in risk-taking contests

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