``Small, yet beautiful: reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.05.012MaRDI QIDQ2013364zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Sang-Hyun Kim

Publication date 17 August 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/63705/1/Accepted_manuscript.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

contest designselection mechanismgroup-sizemultiple winner

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• The beauty of ``bigness: On optimal design of multi-winner contests
• The optimal multi-stage contest
• Contest architecture
• Performance-maximizing large contests
• Optimal contest design under reverse-lottery technology

Cites work

• A note on multi-winner contest mechanisms
• Contest architecture
• The beauty of ``bigness: On optimal design of multi-winner contests

Cited in

(23)

• Performance-maximizing large contests
• A note on multi-winner contest mechanisms
• Optimal contest design under reverse-lottery technology
• Divisionalization in contests
• Multi-prize contests with expectation-based loss-averse players
• When does division matter? Revisiting the optimal contest architecture
• The beauty of ``bigness: On optimal design of multi-winner contests
• Your failure is my opportunity -- effects of elimination in contests
• Winner-leave versus loser-leave in multi-stage nested Tullock contests
• The optimal multi-stage contest
• Simple equilibria in general contests
• Selecting contestants for a rent-seeking contest. A mechanism design approach
• Multiple prizes in research tournaments
• Centralized assignment of prizes and contestants
• Optimal seedings in interdependent contests
• A general framework to quantify the event importance in multi-event contests
• Winner's effort maximization in large contests
• On the optimality of small research tournaments
• When is a talent contest not a talent contest? Sequential performance bias in expert evaluation
• Conflict and competition over multi-issues
• Large contests without single crossing
• Costly information providing in binary contests
• Gaining advantage by winning contests

This page was built for publication: ``Small, yet beautiful: reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2013364)