A note on multi-winner contest mechanisms

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.10.007MaRDI QIDQ2345247zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Sang-Hyun Kim

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.007

zbMATH Keywords

contestmultiple winnerselection mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(10)

• Contests with multiple alternative prizes: public-good/bad prizes and externalities
• ``Small, yet beautiful: reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests
• Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition
• Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
• A contest success function for rankings
• Axiomatization of reverse nested lottery contests
• Optimal contest design under reverse-lottery technology
• Contests with an uncertain number of prizes with a fixed total value
• Contest divisioning
• And the first runner-up is...: comparing winner selection procedures in multi-winner Tullock contests

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