And the first runner-up is...: comparing winner selection procedures in multi-winner Tullock contests

DOI10.1007/S10058-022-00315-5MaRDI QIDQ6913449zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Anwesha Mukherjee, Theodore L. Turocy

Publication date 21 October 2025

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S10058-022-00315-5

zbMATH Keywords

experimentlearninglottery contestmulti-winner contestsstrategic equivalence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites work

• ``Reverse nested lottery contests
• ``Small, yet beautiful: reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests
• A note on multi-winner contest mechanisms
• Contests with group size uncertainty: experimental evidence
• Designing Multiperson Tournaments with Asymmetric Contestants: An Experimental Study
• Discrimination in contests: a survey
• Equilibrium learning in simple contests
• Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
• Learning and dropout in contests: an experimental approach
• Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: cost structure and prize allocation rules
• Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations
• The beauty of ``bigness: On optimal design of multi-winner contests

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