Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109068MaRDI QIDQ2180737zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pablo Amorós

Publication date 14 May 2020

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109068

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designsocial choice aggregation of experts' judgmentssub-majoritarian choice rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition
• Impartial nominations for a prize
• Symmetry and impartial lotteries

Cited in

(4)

• Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts
• Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate
• Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
• Nash implementation of supermajority rules

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