Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules
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Publication:1995319
Abstract: This paper is an axiomatic study of consistent approval-based multi-winner rules, i.e., voting rules that select a fixed-size group of candidates based on approval ballots. We introduce the class of counting rules and provide an axiomatic characterization of this class based on the consistency axiom. Building upon this result, we axiomatically characterize three important consistent multi-winner rules: Proportional Approval Voting, Multi-Winner Approval Voting and the Approval Chamberlin--Courant rule. Our results demonstrate the variety of multi-winner rules and illustrate three different, orthogonal principles that multi-winner voting rules may represent: individual excellence, diversity, and proportionality.
Recommendations
- Properties of multiwinner voting rules
- Utilitarian welfare and representation guarantees of approval-based multiwinner rules
- Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules
- Multiwinner rules with variable number of winners
- Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
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Cited in
(21)- Justified representation in approval-based committee voting
- Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition
- Analysing irresolute multiwinner voting rules with approval ballots via SAT solving
- Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules
- Properties of multiwinner voting rules
- Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule
- Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
- An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule
- Parameterized dichotomy of choosing committees based on approval votes in the presence of outliers
- Multi-winner approval voting with grouped voters
- Utilitarian welfare and representation guarantees of approval-based multiwinner rules
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