Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules
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Publication:1995319
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105173zbMATH Open1458.91076arXiv1704.02453OpenAlexW3114282494MaRDI QIDQ1995319FDOQ1995319
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: This paper is an axiomatic study of consistent approval-based multi-winner rules, i.e., voting rules that select a fixed-size group of candidates based on approval ballots. We introduce the class of counting rules and provide an axiomatic characterization of this class based on the consistency axiom. Building upon this result, we axiomatically characterize three important consistent multi-winner rules: Proportional Approval Voting, Multi-Winner Approval Voting and the Approval Chamberlin--Courant rule. Our results demonstrate the variety of multi-winner rules and illustrate three different, orthogonal principles that multi-winner voting rules may represent: individual excellence, diversity, and proportionality.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.02453
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Cited In (12)
- Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition
- Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule
- Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
- An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule
- Parameterized dichotomy of choosing committees based on approval votes in the presence of outliers
- The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity
- Justifying groups in multiwinner approval voting
- An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium
- Funding public projects: a case for the Nash product rule
- Robustness of approval-based multiwinner voting rules
- Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
- The maximin support method: an extension of the d'Hondt method to approval-based multiwinner elections
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