An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium
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Publication:6664085
DOI10.3982/TE5825MaRDI QIDQ6664085FDOQ6664085
Authors: Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt 
Publication date: 16 January 2025
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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