scientific article

Publication date: 18 September 1992

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

proper equilibria evolutionarily stable strategies Nash equilibrium signalling games repeated games bargaining evolutionary game theory incomplete information fair division subgame perfect equilibria extensive form game disturbed games regular equilibria perfect equilibria sequential equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01)

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