Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
From MaRDI portal
Publication:532686
DOI10.1007/S00182-009-0161-XzbMATH Open1211.91074OpenAlexW2120779234MaRDI QIDQ532686FDOQ532686
Authors: Péter Eső, James Schummer 
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:d1128352-abe5-42af-955c-ec16e9494209
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Strategic Information Transmission
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
- Cheap talk and burned money
- An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
- D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of types
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
- Informational Equilibrium
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
Cited In (8)
- Partially informative signaling
- Job market signaling and employer learning
- Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games
- Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling
- Learning and type compatibility in signaling games
- Verifiable disclosure
- Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information
- Risky shifts as multi-sender signaling
This page was built for publication: Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q532686)
