Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 51788 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
- An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
- Cheap talk and burned money
- D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of types
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Informational Equilibrium
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
Cited in
(9)- Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games
- Risky shifts as multi-sender signaling
- Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games
- Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information
- Learning and type compatibility in signaling games
- Verifiable disclosure
- Partially informative signaling
- Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling
- Job market signaling and employer learning
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