Risky shifts as multi-sender signaling

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.01.003zbMATH Open1400.91108OpenAlexW2781952036MaRDI QIDQ1701034FDOQ1701034

Takakazu Honryo

Publication date: 22 February 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.003

zbMATH Keywords

signaling gamerisky shifts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Competence and Ideology
• Political Motivations
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns
• Hiding information in electoral competition.
• On the relationship between individual and group decisions

Cited In (3)

• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games
• Political selection and the optimal concentration of political power

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