Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling

DOI10.1007/S11229-017-1536-3zbMATH Open1474.91021OpenAlexW2746288880MaRDI QIDQ2052673FDOQ2052673

Authors: Don Fallis, Peter J. Lewis 

Publication date: 26 November 2021

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13337/1/deceptivesynthesefinal.pdf

Recommendations

• Behavioural deception and formal models of communication
• Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
• Exploiting Partial Observability for Optimal Deception
• The truthful signalling hypothesis: an explicit general equilibrium model
• Modeling bluffing behavior in signaling security games
• Dishonest signalling in a variant of pygmalion game
• Modelling deception using theory of mind in multi-agent systems
• Deception in sender-receiver games

zbMATH Keywords

sender-receiver gamesmisinformationdeceptive signalsfunctional deceptionmeasures of inaccuracysignaling theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief
• Deterministic Chaos and the Evolution of Meaning
• Deception in sender-receiver games
• Attitudes toward epistemic risk and the value of experiments
• Behavioural deception and formal models of communication
• Information and Inaccuracy
• Content in simple signalling systems

Cited In (6)

• Strategies to Reduce the Probability of a Misleading Signal
• Deception in sender-receiver games
• Behavioural deception and formal models of communication
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Deceptive updating and minimal information methods
• The pragmatics of self-deception

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