Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling
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Recommendations
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1063671 (Why is no real title available?)
- Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief
- Attitudes toward epistemic risk and the value of experiments
- Behavioural deception and formal models of communication
- Content in simple signalling systems
- Deception in sender-receiver games
- Deterministic Chaos and the Evolution of Meaning
- Information and Inaccuracy
Cited in
(6)- The pragmatics of self-deception
- Strategies to Reduce the Probability of a Misleading Signal
- Deception in sender-receiver games
- Behavioural deception and formal models of communication
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 711299 (Why is no real title available?)
- Deceptive updating and minimal information methods
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