Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief
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Publication:5192430
DOI10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_11zbMath1170.03320OpenAlexW2153273742MaRDI QIDQ5192430
Publication date: 5 August 2009
Published in: Synthese Library (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_11
Related Items (39)
Foundations of probability ⋮ You've come a long way, Bayesians ⋮ Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity ⋮ Objective Bayesianism and the maximum entropy principle ⋮ Measuring inaccuracy of uncertain doxastic states in many-valued logical systems ⋮ Eliciting uncertainties: a two structure approach ⋮ Probability for the revision theory of truth ⋮ Bayesian coherentism ⋮ Logical ignorance and logical learning ⋮ Probabilism, entropies and strictly proper scoring rules ⋮ The value of truth: introduction to the topical collection ⋮ Context-sensitivity and the preface paradox for credence ⋮ Scoring, truthlikeness, and value ⋮ On the pragmatic and epistemic virtues of inference to the best explanation ⋮ TOWARDS THE INEVITABILITY OF NON-CLASSICAL PROBABILITY ⋮ Correcting credences with chances ⋮ Credence as doxastic tendency ⋮ Accuracy, conditionalization, and probabilism ⋮ A modesty proposal ⋮ Repelling a Prussian charge with a solution to a paradox of Dubins ⋮ The qualitative paradox of non-conglomerability ⋮ ACCURACY AND UR-PRIOR CONDITIONALIZATION ⋮ The dialectics of infinitism and coherentism: inferential justification versus holism and coherence ⋮ What to do with a forecast? ⋮ A graded Bayesian coherence notion ⋮ GRADATIONAL ACCURACY AND NONCLASSICAL SEMANTICS ⋮ DEGREE SUPERVALUATIONAL LOGIC ⋮ An accuracy argument in favor of ranking theory ⋮ Measuring the overall incoherence of credence functions ⋮ On the justification of deduction and induction ⋮ Generalized probabilism: Dutch books and accuracy domination ⋮ Probability as a measure of information added ⋮ Agreement and updating for self-locating belief ⋮ On de Finetti's instrumentalist philosophy of probability ⋮ New foundations for counterfactuals ⋮ Goals and the informativeness of prior probabilities ⋮ Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling ⋮ Aggregating incoherent agents who disagree ⋮ Aggregating infinitely many probability measures
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