Credence as doxastic tendency

DOI10.1007/s11229-018-01938-4zbMath1506.03029OpenAlexW2891290113WikidataQ129218386 ScholiaQ129218386MaRDI QIDQ2690184

Dominik Kauss

Publication date: 15 March 2023

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01938-4

zbMATH Keywords

subjective probabilitycertaintycredencedegree of beliefcertainty viewthreshold view

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Related Items (1)

Context-sensitivity and the preface paradox for credence

Cites Work

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• Contemporary epistemic logic and the Lockean thesis
• Reducing belief simpliciter to degrees of belief
• Radical interpretation
• What conditional probability could not be
• Belief and certainty
• What are degrees of belief?
• Subjective Probability
• The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief
• Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief
• Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief

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