What are degrees of belief?

DOI10.1007/S11225-007-9059-4zbMATH Open1124.03303OpenAlexW2130987845MaRDI QIDQ2454643FDOQ2454643

Authors: Lina Eriksson, Alan Hájek 

Publication date: 16 October 2007

Published in: Studia Logica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1885/17248

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zbMATH Keywords

rationalityrepresentation theoremdegrees of beliefprobabilismDutch book argumentprimitivismbetting interpretationradical interpretation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Subjective Probability
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Pragmatics, Logic and Information Processing

Cited In (31)

• The consistency argument for ranking functions
• Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism?
• The nature of doubt and a new puzzle about belief, doubt, and confidence
• Eliciting uncertainties: a two structure approach
• A normatively adequate credal reductivism
• New foundations for counterfactuals
• The interference problem for the betting interpretation of degrees of belief
• Context-sensitivity and the preface paradox for credence
• How can representationalism accommodate degrees of belief? A dispositional representationalist proposal
• Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief
• Degrees of Belief
• Belief and certainty
• On de Finetti's instrumentalist philosophy of probability
• Reducing belief simpliciter to degrees of belief
• Are there degrees of belief?
• Contra counterfactism
• What probability probably isn't
• Belief and Degrees of Belief
• Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities*
• The main two arguments for probabilism are flawed
• Vagueness, uncertainty and degrees of belief: two kinds of indeterminacy -- one kind of credence
• Probabilism, representation theorems, and whether deliberation crowds out prediction
• Degrees of belief, expected and actual
• Credence as doxastic tendency
• Betting against the Zen monk: on preferences and partial belief
• Cognitivist probabilism
• Rationality and indeterminate probabilities
• Vague credence
• The qualitative paradox of non-conglomerability
• Belief without credence
• Belief, credence, and evidence

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