Publication:5704417
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zbMath1088.03005MaRDI QIDQ5704417
Publication date: 15 November 2005
68T27: Logic in artificial intelligence
03A05: Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations
03B42: Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change)
03B48: Probability and inductive logic
68T30: Knowledge representation
03-02: Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to mathematical logic and foundations
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