scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2229035
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Publication:5704417
zbMath1088.03005MaRDI QIDQ5704417
Publication date: 15 November 2005
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Knowledge representation (68T30) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to mathematical logic and foundations (03-02)
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