Inferential justification and the transparency of belief

DOI10.1111/NOUS.12088zbMATH Open1384.03014OpenAlexW2136111533MaRDI QIDQ2965385FDOQ2965385

Authors: David James Barnett 

Publication date: 3 March 2017

Published in: Nôus (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://philarchive.org/rec/BARIJA-2

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zbMATH Keywords

transparencyevidenceinferenceMoore's paradoxintrospection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Multiple studies and evidential defeat

Cited In (7)

• Justification by acquaintance
• Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence
• Self-intimation, infallibility, and higher-order evidence
• The two faces of compatibility with justified beliefs
• Is justification easy or impossible? Getting acquainted with a middle road
• Why transparency undermines economy
• A defense of temperate epistemic transparency

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