Two approaches to belief revision

DOI10.1007/s10670-017-9968-1zbMath1474.03072OpenAlexW2786374509MaRDI QIDQ2051124

Ted Shear, Branden Fitelson

Publication date: 24 November 2021

Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9968-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Related Items (4)

PROBABILISTIC STABILITY, AGM REVISION OPERATORS AND MAXIMUM ENTROPY ⋮ A basis for AGM revision in Bayesian probability revision ⋮ Belief Revision from Probability ⋮ Probability, coherent belief and coherent belief changes

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