The review paradox: on the diachronic costs of not closing rational belief under conjunction

DOI10.1111/NOUS.12020MaRDI QIDQ2965397zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hannes Leitgeb

Publication date 3 March 2017

Published in Nôus (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12020

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

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Cites work

• A textbook of belief dynamics. Theory change and database updating
• Propositional reasoning that tracks probabilistic reasoning
• Reducing belief simpliciter to degrees of belief
• Subjective Probability

Cited in

(11)

• Mind the Croc! Rationality Gaps vis-à-vis the Crocodile Paradox
• A structural justification of probabilism: from partition invariance to subjective probability
• The preface paradox revisited
• Belief and rational indeterminacy
• Two approaches to belief revision
• Reconciling enkrasia and higher-order defeat
• A bitter pill for closure
• The pragmatic encroachment debate
• Non-eliminative structuralism, Fregean abstraction, and non-rigid structures
• Once you think you're wrong, you must be right: new versions of the preface paradox
• Believing conjunctions

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