Propositional reasoning that tracks probabilistic reasoning

DOI10.1007/S10992-012-9237-3MaRDI QIDQ1929756zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hanti Lin, Kevin T. Kelly

Publication date 9 January 2013

Published in Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9237-3

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian conditioningbelief revisionGettier problemlottery paradoxprobabilistic reasoninguncertain acceptanceuncertain propositional reasoning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10) Probability and inductive logic (03B48)

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Cites work

• A geo-logical solution to the lottery paradox, with applications to conditional logic
• For the Sake of the Argument
• Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
• On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions
• Rational belief change, Popper functions and counterfactuals
• Temporal logics in AI: semantical and ontological considerations
• The extent of non-conglomerability of finitely additive probabilities

Cited in

(32)

• Bridging ranking theory and the stability theory of belief
• A game-theoretic approach to peer disagreement
• Adjectival vagueness in a Bayesian model of interpretation
• Rigged lotteries: a diachronic problem for reducing belief to credence
• Theory choice, theory change, and inductive truth-conduciveness
• What should I believe about what would have been the case?
• Two approaches to belief revision
• A probabilistic semantics for belief logic
• Probability, coherent belief and coherent belief changes
• Foundations of everyday practical reasoning
• Formal epistemology
• Belief, credence, and evidence
• Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities*
• The review paradox: on the diachronic costs of not closing rational belief under conjunction
• Tracking information
• Probabilistic reasoning with answer sets
• A geo-logical solution to the lottery paradox, with applications to conditional logic
• Updating probability: tracking statistics as criterion
• Tracking reasons with extensions of relevant logics
• PROBABILISTIC STABILITY, AGM REVISION OPERATORS AND MAXIMUM ENTROPY
• Advances in Artificial Intelligence – SBIA 2004
• Bayesian stopping
• A basis for AGM revision in Bayesian probability revision
• Belief Revision from Probability
• A logical approach to doxastic causal reasoning
• Cut-off points for the rational believer
• Between burgess and Lewis. I: Logics without rational monotonicity
• A structural justification of probabilism: from partition invariance to subjective probability
• Belief revision normalized
• A semantics for weak, question-sensitive belief
• Doxastic logic based on causal structures
• Bayesian update rules and minimal-change preference revision

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